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1 Executive Summary 
 
Providers of electronic communication services are in the spotlight when it comes to Internet 
security. European citizens and enterprises have to trust them before they engage in 
commercial or social online transactions. However, spam and security incidents continue to 
hinder communications. Indeed, a lack of trust is having a severe impact on the information 
society in Europe. To improve this situation, the EU has provided a legal framework for 
electronic communication services and how to secure them.  
 
This report describes how providers have taken into account these legal requirements and 
what can be done to further secure European networks and services. It is based on surveys 
that ENISA conducted among providers as well as information gained from conferences and 
workshops. It focuses on recent developments and trends rather than on detailed statistical 
data. The facts, conclusions and proposals in this report are grouped under three major 
themes: 
 
Study - Overview
Increasing 
transparency
Defining 
appropriate 
security
Setting 
standards
• Reporting of 
security breaches
• Becoming aware 
of a security or 
spam problem
• State of the art 
and cost of 
implementations
• Email security 
versus privacy
• Technical and 
organizational 
security measures
• Measures to fight
spam
 
 
Increasing transparency 
 
Reporting of security breaches – While reporting is to some extent mandatory in the US, 
reporting in the EU is mostly on a voluntary basis. Meaningful metrics and shared data on 
security incidents are necessary to increase transparency of information security and plan for 
appropriate and efficient countermeasures.  
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Becoming aware of a security or spam problem – Many security problems go unnoticed. 
While the visible level of spam continues to be very high, the nature of the threat changes. 
More and more spam is unknowingly sent from citizen’s computers acting as so-called 
zombies. Brand names are hijacked and dubious registrars fool domain holders. Some 
providers see data on threats as proprietary information that gives them competitive 
advantage. Furthermore, many still rely solely on complaints from customers rather than 
proactive network monitoring. They also fail to inform customers on costs of 
countermeasures. Providers have to deepen their analysis of incidents, while Europe in 
general needs a warning mechanism to identify and address upcoming threats. 
 
 
Defining appropriate security 
 
State of the art and cost of implementations – Most providers follow so-called industry best 
practice. Many offer free spam filtering or hotlines even at great costs to themselves. 
Reported data on damages from security incidents is rare, making a cost-benefit analysis 
difficult. Providers also have to improve customer confidence, for instance by showing 
compliance with security certificates. Further EU research is necessary. 
 
Email security versus privacy – Providers see a conflict between delivering secured services 
and protecting privacy. Opinion 118 of the Article 29 Working Party on privacy helps finding 
the right balance between these conflicting goals. Still, the cost of widespread customized 
filtering is prohibitive and a further dialogue necessary between privacy and security 
proponents. 
 
 
Setting standards 
 
Technical and Organizational Security Measures – The goal is not to find, but rather to refine 
security measures. Quarantining infected computers, securing the Domain Name Service, and 
protecting neighbouring networks should be on the technical agenda. Providing clear contact 
details, offering detailed guidance to subscribers and raising awareness for identity theft helps 
secure communications from an organisational perspective. Consumer training could be 
provided in public-private partnerships. Measures depend on the type of business, the size 
and the maturity of the provider. 
 
Measures to fight spam – In the EU, various anti-spam laws are in place. The challenge is to 
enforce them, in Europe and beyond. The OECD Anti-Spam Toolkit, codes of conduct for 
providers, sender authentication techniques, fines for spammers and initiatives on collecting 
data on spam play a role. Fear of counter-lawsuits from spammers, the prospect of additional 
income from dubious email marketing services and the burdensome reporting of spam cases 
continue to challenge some providers. Awareness for spam and related security threats must 
remain high. 
 
 
The following report is a deliverable of ENISA’s Work Program 2006. This research will be 
continued in 2007. 
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2.2 Motivation 
The European citizen does not yet feel secure when using the Internet, although a lot has been 
done already to make the Internet a safer place to communicate, to interact with governments 
and to do business. It is necessary to document security measures taken and communicate 
results of these improvements to the European audience.  
 
In particular, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), telecommunication companies and other 
content and service providers play a major role in securing the Internet. They have 
implemented a wide range of security and anti-spam measures, not only following their own 
risk assessment and cost/benefits analysis, but also in response to national legislation and 
written guidance for information security. Many of these have been put in place following 
European Directives, in particular the European Directive 2002/58/EC (“Directive on privacy 
and electronic communications”) and the Directives of the regulatory framework for 
electronic communications (2002/19-22/EC). 
 
This deliverable from ENISA reports on the current status in Europe and provides an outlook 
to the future. It aims at increasing trust in electronic communications among businesses, 
governments and citizens of Europe, leading to a higher acceptance of eGovernment and 
eCommerce services. This is necessary to achieve the goals of the i2010 initiative, creating an 
open and competitive single market for information society and media services within the 
European Union. 
 
2.3 Methodology 
This paper is the second part of deliverable 4.2.b of ENISA’s Work Program 2006, referred 
to as a “Study listing measures adopted and made available by providers of electronic 
communication services to comply with legal requirements regarding technical and 
organizational measures to safeguard the security of their services”, envisioned for the 
second quarter of 2006. The first part was delivered in February 2006, following a request 
from the European Commission (20051103_COM) to start working on this issue as early as 
possible and to deliver results before the deadline that was originally planned (2Q2006). This 
first study conducted at the end of 2005 / beginning of 2006, is subsequently referred to as 
“ENISA Survey”. It has the reference number ENISA/TD/SP/06/0055. 
 
Consequently, ENISA adjusted the focus for this report. Complementing the first study with 
more data points and slightly adjusted questions, this report is based on data from the first 
study, from a number of workshops and conferences that ENISA attended since its inception 
and on extensive Internet research.  
 
The report is organized around six major themes – topics that are most relevant, most 
neglected or most controversial. For each of the themes, it provides facts & observations, 
evaluations & conclusions, and advice & proposals.  
 
The facts & observations section is a summary of ENISA’s own studies and other data 
sources. Rather than listing all available data, this section focuses on recent trends and 
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interesting data points. The information is given as-is, with short reference to the source. A 
detailed list of references including web links is attached in the appendix. 
 
The evaluations & conclusions section describes the opinion of ENISA. Beyond the facts, 
they explain the reasoning why ENISA chose to list the data points above and they prepare 
the basis for the third section. There is not always a direct link between the statements of the 
three sections; several statements have to be seen in combination. 
 
The advice & proposals section provide a draft for solutions. This can range from an early 
idea that needs further discussions with stakeholders and partners of ENISA to a strong 
proposal whose implementation ENISA will support with its weight in the European security 
community. This can pave the way to refined legislation, or at a minimum it will bring 
additional projects, workshops and deliverables from ENISA itself. 
 
Note that the recommendations in this report do not replace the recommendations in the 
February 2006 report. 
 
The report has been designed to bring concise and hopefully new information to the educated 
information security community. It is neither the definite best practice guide on spam 
fighting, nor is it a general blueprint for future security legislation. It is merely a contribution 
to understanding the challenges that providers face, an outline of solutions that leading 
providers take – and that others may want to adopt – and an attempt to make the reader (re-) 
gain trust in electronic communications in Europe. 
 
2.4 Overview 
Security of electronic communication services is a complex topic. There are technical, legal, 
organisational, political and business aspects. The issue of tackling spam is equally complex, 
but even more dynamic as threats and countermeasures evolve quickly. There is no one 
solution. Any paper on these topics has to address a variety of perspectives and opinions.  
 
This document describes the current status of security and spam in electronic 
communications services and envisions the development in the next two years. It does so by 
grouping dozens of data points, observations and proposals under three major themes. 
 
“Increasing transparency” has been identified by ENISA as the most crucial aspect. Still, the 
information security community needs to learn more about the current situation in European 
networks and the motivation of all players. It is especially relevant, because a number of 
projects are under way that could help increase transparency. Actual achievements are within 
reach. 
 
“Defining appropriate security” has been a goal at least since Directive 2002/58/EC came 
into existence. However, taking into account cost and state of the art is often paid only lip 
service, and ever when processes for doing so are drafted, they are rarely executed. It is 
difficult to see how major advances can be made in the short-term, although some progress 
with regard to privacy vs. security is visible. 
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“Setting standards” is a topic of ongoing discussion. Here the challenge is to stay informed 
about recent initiatives and developments both in the technical and political arena. Significant 
progress has been made in the past three years, but it is not yet time to shift the focus. 
Security measures and anti-spam measures require continuous attention. 
 
Shaping information security 
and anti-spam measures in Europe
OECD CNSA
London AP
MAAWG ETNO
ENISA NRAs
EU Members States Providers
Created EU Directive 
2002/58/EC
Transposed into 
national law
Follow and implement in 
organization and technology
 
The general guideline for this report is the European Directive 2002/58/EC. It has been used 
to structure the questionnaire which was the basis of the first survey. Moreover, some of the 
themes of this report link directly to the Directive, especially Article 4 and Article 13. Please 
be reminded that the Directive is not directly applicable to providers of electronic 
communication services, who are the main group under discussion in this paper. The 
25 Member States of the European Union transpose a Directive into national laws, and only 
these laws are binding for providers in the EU. In addition, there are a number of groups and 
initiatives in the information security community who provide additional guidance with 
regard to the Directive, the laws and their implementations by providers. 
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3 Increasing transparency 
 “If you cannot measure it, then you cannot manage it”, is common wisdom in corporate 
management. How can we manage information security if we still have so few data points 
and – more importantly – if these are not comparable? How can we decide on 
countermeasures if we do not have a clear – and timely - picture of what the problems are? 
Becoming aware of security risks is a necessary starting point, sharing this information with 
peers or reporting it officially is the complementary step. 
3.1 Reporting of security breaches 
Reporting of security breaches is a sensitive and heavily discussed topic. Not only is there 
disagreement as to whether and how reporting should take place, there is also no widely 
accepted definition of what a security breach is. A targeted port scan, a sniffed password, a 
web site defacement and a large-scale credit card fraud can all be considered breaches. It 
should also be noted that there is a difference between “a breach” (a successful attack) and “a 
risk of a breach” (a vulnerability) as mentioned by the EU Directive 2002/58/EC. 
 
Reporting of security breaches
• Make reporting of breaches prevalent and data 
comparable
• Keep vulnerability research motivated
• Promote metrics
• Provide information 
to customers
• Incoming spam vs. 
outgoing spam
• Promote information 
sharing
 
Facts & Observations 
 
- Most providers decide by themselves if and how subscribers and others should be 
informed. Around half of the providers inform customers about the risk of a breach via 
private channels (i.e. private web site, email or mail). Very few report to the public (e.g. 
by publishing on the website or in a press release). Only in Finland providers are 
requested to report to the Finish National Regulatory Authority (NRA) 
(ENISA Survey 2006). 
- California’s State Bill 1386, which made reporting of security breaches that involve 
Californian citizens mandatory, went into effect on July 1st 2003. Following this 
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example, 30 other US states passed a similar law, 20 of them come into force between 1st 
January 2006 and 1st January 2007. As a result, a number of high-profile breaches became 
public and raised awareness for identity theft in the US. 
- Vulnerability research becomes more and more commercialized. A market develops, 
where security researchers do not inform the public, but rather give the information only 
to security companies which pay them. (Symantec’s Internet Threat Report 3Q2006). 
- The “Time to Compromise” describes how long a computer system without protection 
can be connected to the Internet before it gets compromised. This is a metric that 
illustrates the need for patches. The Time to Compromise for a system varies, depending 
on the ISP’s policy and the filtering rules of neighbouring systems. (Symantec’s Internet 
Threat Report 3Q2006). 
- Although most UK businesses have procedures in place to log and respond to security 
incidents (83%), only some maintain evidence to legal standards (21%) or can deal with 
claims that an outsider has taken control of the network (22%). (DTI Report 2006) 
- To promote the disclosure and sharing of cyber-security information amongst firms, the 
US federal government has encouraged the establishment of many industry based 
Information Sharing & Analysis Centers (ISACs) under Presidential Decision 
Directive 63. (From “The Economic Consequences of Sharing Security Information”, 
2005)  
 
 
Evaluations & Conclusions  
 
- It seems that reporting of breaches increases transparency, encourages countermeasures 
and overall helps decreasing the number of breaches. However, comparable quantitative 
data that would underline this assumption is missing. 
- In most of Europe, reporting of breaches is not seen as mandatory and is not formalized. 
If there is no common approach for measuring and reporting, data cannot be shared. 
- Commercialized vulnerability research has two effects. On the one hand it is an incentive 
to spend time and other resources on research, thus helping the community to identify 
security problems. On the other hand vulnerability information is not anymore shared 
freely between researchers, so the risk posture will become more difficult to judge. It is 
important to have a coordinated vulnerability publication process so that vendors have 
enough time to provide patches.  
- There are a number of things that providers could do to help identifying and 
communicating security breaches, for example install honey-pots and honey-nets to trace 
hackers’ activities or monitor unused IP address space. ISPs could also measure the Time 
to Compromise for selected vulnerabilities on a regular basis and share or report this 
information. This would allow providers to coordinate their policies, rewarding those 
providers who help increase the Time to Compromise and shun those who do not. It 
would also allow countries to some extent to describe their security posture, assuming 
that providers take their measurements within geographic borders. 
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Advice & Proposals 
 
• Providers should start reporting to NRAs or to a trusted third party on a voluntary basis, 
using a set of agreed metrics.  
• Member States should encourage or require reporting of security breaches. 
• The EU should introduce a range of guidance and/or legislation that provides incentives 
for reporting of security breaches or makes it even mandatory.  
• ENISA should initiate a partnership for collecting information about trends and volumes 
security breaches, including possibly ENISA itself acting as an Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centre.  
• A regulated market of vulnerability research is currently not an option. However, the EU 
must keep an eye on the development of commercialisation. A coordinated vulnerability 
publication process is important, balancing full disclosure (which puts pressure on vendors 
to issue patches) and controlled disclosure (which allows especially to secure critical 
infrastructure implementations before the vulnerability is made public). 
3.2 Becoming aware of a security or spam problem 
Before a provider can report on security breaches or massive spam problems, it has to 
become aware of them. Ideally, the provider would investigate the origin of the problem, the 
cause and the impact to its own infrastructure. The provider can monitor the network 
proactively or wait until someone reports the problem. 
 
 
Becoming aware of a security or spam problem
• 80% of all emails are spam
• Most of today’s spam 
is sent via zombies
• EU countries receive 
more spam than they send
• Zombie networks are 
getting smaller
• Providers still rely too 
much on complaints
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Facts & Observations 
 
- Almost two thirds of all emails that European providers receive is spam, while outgoing 
spam accounts for only about 5% of all emails (ENISA Survey 2006). However, some 
reports also indicate that more than 20% of all spam worldwide originates from Europe 
(see section “Measures to fight spam”). 
- 80% of all emails is spam, based on an evaluation of approx. 390 million mailboxes 
worldwide. (MAAWG Email Metrics Program 1Q2006) 
- 80% of spam is sent via zombies, according to a vendor report from 2004 (Sandvine). 
This figure is still widely accepted (MAAWG Conference) 
- To a large extent, providers rely on complaints from subscribers to become aware of 
spam or security problems. In addition, providers cite complaints from others ISPs as a 
source of information. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
- More than half of the providers inform customers of remedies that they can take, but very 
few providers inform them about the associated costs. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
- Providers observe more targeted malware. Hackers plan that such malware has only a 
short life time and they use only a few hundred zombies to stay under the radar of 
network monitoring. (MAAWG conference) 
- Some providers see information about fraudsters etc. as proprietary and competitive 
information and do not want to share it. 
- There are more than one hundred hijacked brands, several hundred unique password 
stealing malicious code applications, more than one thousand password stealing malicious 
code URLs and up to ten thousand new phishing sites every months (APWG Phishing 
Activity Trends Report, February 2006). 
- Some dubious registrars also try to trick domain holders into changing their registrar 
and registering with them. This scheme is hardly any different from phishing. 
- There are ongoing discussions at ICANN to close public access to the WhoIs database in 
order to protect the privacy of domain owners. WhoIs databases are an important first step 
in identifying spammers. According to Spamhaus, even bogus entries in the WhoIs 
database help identifying spammers. (MAAWG Conference) 
 
Evaluations & Conclusions  
 
- According to ENISA’s observations, the spam/email ratio in Europe is only slightly better 
than the measurement of the (US-dominated) Message Anti-Abuse Working Group 
(MAAWG). Figures have reached a high level and a mailbox without any spam-
protection is practically useless. 
- While some reports indicate that spam coming from Europe has decreased, others show 
that it is on the rise. Both may be true. The legal situation makes it difficult for spammers 
to hide in the EU. However, technically their emails might still come from Europe – and 
increasingly they do. This must be attributed to an increased rate of bot-net infections, 
facilitated by an ever larger number of flat-rate always-on broadband connections in 
Europe. That is, while most spammers are located outside the EU, the infrastructure that 
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they use – bot-nets of hijacked consumer PCs – is located in countries like France, Spain, 
and Poland.  
- The spam problem is multi-dimensional. Dealing with spam requires a technical approach 
both on the sending side (i.e. with regard to bot-nets) as well as on the receiving side. 
Dealing with spammers requires an enforced legal framework that allows for legitimate 
direct marketing and removes incentives for spammers, i.e. sets fines that are a real 
counterbalance to the income from spam.  
- Increasingly security breaches and spam are not disjoint topics. A breach happens when 
an infected email attachment installs a Trojan on a computer; and spam is often sent from 
a bot-net which is the result of a number of security breaches. 
- Current and emerging risks such as domain kiting or domain registration scams evolve 
quickly (see section “State of the art and cost of implementations”). In order to find the 
appropriate political, regulatory, or technical response, Europe needs a fast and 
coordinated warning and information mechanisms. 
- Some providers rely only on complaints from subscribers. For a timely response, a more 
proactive approach is necessary, taking into account complaints from subscribers as well 
as monitoring traffic continuously. Indeed, most of the providers pursue such a combined 
approach. It is encouraging that providers also react to complaints from other providers. 
However, the ratio between partner complaints, subscriber complaints and problems 
identified by monitoring is not yet clear and requires further analysis. 
 
Advice & Proposals 
 
• With regarding to problem identification, providers should rely first on their own 
monitoring capabilities, second on complaints from other providers and only then on 
complaints from subscribers. 
• The EU should support the positive identification of email senders (e.g. SIDF, DKIM). 
Providers should implement it as soon as possible and in a cost efficient manner. 
• Providers should be encouraged (if not requested) to monitor their networks proactively 
rather then reacting only on complaints from customers. 
• ENISA should deepen the analysis of the ways that providers learn about security 
incidents and spam trends.  
• Europe needs to establish a warning mechanism to identify and address emerging threats. 
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4 Defining appropriate security 
For a long time, a commonly accepted goal for information security was to bring it to the 
highest possible level. This is no longer the case. Overly high security measures will be 
circumvented with a justification by the business, while it still holds true that cutting budgets 
for desperately needed measures jeopardizes security and puts business at risk. Moreover, 
security measures often conflict with privacy rights of citizens. Striking the right balance and 
giving providers enough information at hand to make an adequate decision is the main 
objective today.  
4.1 State of the art and cost of implementations 
Information regarding what is possible, what is affordable and what is appropriate can come 
from a variety of sources. No source is perfect, hence it depends on how much one trusts the 
data and the guidance that a particular entity compiled. Of course the authority and reach of 
that entity also plays a role.  
 
Facts & Observations 
 
- Most providers simply follow “industry best practice”. Around half of the providers 
follow international standards. National legislation and advice from the national computer 
security organization or from the NRA play a smaller role. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
- About half of the providers perform an internal risk assessment, but few use a defined 
risk management process or a service level agreement. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
- Many providers offer spam filtering free-of-charge. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
- Costs for running hotlines are already very high, and taking security-related calls is an 
additional burden for providers. (MAAWG Conference) 
- Several industry surveys have reported damage figures (e.g. FBI/CSI report in the US, 
DTI survey in the UK, AUS/CERT report in Australia, worldwide Deloitte survey), but 
these figures vary widely and are not comparable. (META Group Research Note #2982) 
- Security experts often argue the usefulness of statistical data on damages from security 
breaches. For example, the Computer Security Institute (CSI) stated in its 2006 report that 
the costs of security incidents are going down, while market analyst Gartner was quick to 
question such data. Still, there is no generally accepted measuring scheme. (CSI/Gartner) 
- Most people see a benefit in displaying a trust seal on a website, according to a vendor 
report from 2006 (Goodmail Systems). 
- Many domain names are registered only for a few days at no cost (“domain name 
kiting”), enabling click-fraud. On the other hand, domain-name dispute resolution is very 
complex and costly, often involving the World Intellectual Property Organization (see 
www.wipo.int ), ICANN (see www.icann.org ), registrars and law firms. Hence, while 
many have to share the cost, only few gain benefits from this scam. 
- Forensic investigations of spam and security incidents are complex (e.g. maintaining the 
chain of custody) and often feasible only with expensive software. They also require a 
high level of expertise. (MAAWG conference) 
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Evaluations & Conclusions  
 
- Although various reports on the costs of security measures (and the potential costs of not 
implementing them) have been published, there is still no common ground for measuring 
and hence no way to compare different data. 
- In a global economy, the state of the art of information security evolves internationally. 
National initiatives should focus on co-operation rather than on competition about the 
most appropriate measures. 
- A decision whether measures are cost effective and appropriate can only be made in a 
specific context. For example, most providers deemed it appropriate to sponsor spam 
filtering in an attempt to gain and maintain customer trust – and market share. 
- An investment in information security should yield some value, but in many cases 
providers fail to display and market this value appropriately. A trust seal or a certification 
helps communicate the trustworthiness of the service and justify the investments made. 
- State of the art and cost appropriateness of information security are moving targets. Using 
a risk management methodology does not give answers but helps finding them and makes 
the process repeatable.  
 
 
Advice & Proposals 
 
• Regarding Internet governance discussions, the Commission should be aware of the 
conflict between easy domain name registration (helping market development) and 
thorough domain name registration (helping the fight against phishing and spamming). 
• The EU could encourage research and other projects that support the development and 
distribution of investigative tools. 
• The EU could help analysing some aspects of security policies of European countries in 
order to improve the overall efficiency throughout Europe. 
• ENISA should continue providing guidance on risk assessment and risk management 
methodologies (see “Implementation principles and Inventories for Risk Management / 
Risk Assessment”, June 2006). 
• Member States should support and promote the use of risk assessment and risk 
management methodologies to help achieving a better understanding of the cost-benefit 
relationships of information security. 
 
4.2 Email security versus privacy 
A major principle of privacy is to keep personal data stored and transmitted securely. No one 
must get access to personally addressed information except the recipient. But what if the 
recipient does not want to have access to all that information? Like with Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle that states that position and momentum of a particle cannot be 
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determined at the same time with arbitrary precision, it is quite impossible to check private 
emails for security problems without breaking privacy, at least to some extent. 
 
Email security versus privacy
• Conflict exists between 
ISP obligations and privacy
• Blocking PCs is often 
deemed illegal
• Article 29 WP opinion 
mostly allows filtering
• Providers would like to see 
more info on spam laws
 
Facts & Observations 
 
- Nearly 2/3 of providers replied that they think there is a conflict between ISP obligations 
of delivering messages/protection of privacy and the use of spam filters that block some 
of the messages. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
- The fight against bot-net causes problems for providers, because blocking legal and paid-
for connections from consumers who are unaware of their infected PCs may violate 
privacy laws and is often deemed illegal. 
- The Article 29 Working Party discussed the balance between privacy and security in 
Opinion 2/2006 (WP118). In short, filtering of emails is allowed under certain conditions 
in the more obvious cases (i.e. protection from viruses and spam), but in other evolving 
scenarios (e.g. customization services) further analysis is necessary. (Art.29 WP opinion). 
- Allowing subscribers to opt-out from filtering is technically challenging. If filtering is 
implemented in the backbone at IP level, the provider either allows all email from the 
filtered network (including spam) or the subscriber cannot receive any email from that 
network. Specific filtering (i.e. allowing incoming email from a defined address) is only 
feasible if the user is allowed to see all emails, making it very costly for the provider who 
has to transfer all emails (including spam) and provide a mechanism for 
receiving/rejecting specific emails. (MAAWG conference) 
- Most of the providers would like a workshop giving inputs on laws and legal problems 
regarding spam. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
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Evaluations & Conclusions  
 
- Fighting spam is linked to filtering, but providers have obligations to deliver emails. If 
they want to help customers there is always the danger of being in conflict with the law. 
- Some providers unofficially told ENISA that they did not want to reply to our 
questionnaire because questions were embarrassing. They also said that they do filtering, 
but they don't want that their customers know it.  
- There will always be a conflict between “protection of the individual” (privacy) and 
“protection from the individual” (security), but there is a range of options to balance the 
two sides. Before the Article 29 Working Party opinion, the range of legal options has not 
been clear, leading to uncertainties among the providers. 
- It is not the task of the providers to solve legal conflicts; they need clear guidance 
regarding what is allowed and what not. The Opinion 2/2006, published in February 
2006, clarifies legal aspects of filtering significantly. It seems that the Article 29 Working 
Party document on email screening is not yet well known. 
 
Advice & Proposals 
 
• Providers should take in account Opinion 2/2006 document regarding email screening 
• ENISA should promote Opinion 2/2006 views and could organize a workshop on laws 
and legal aspects regarding spam. 
• ENISA should encourage Member States to raise awareness among citizens for blocked 
PCs, making them aware that a failure to connect to the Internet can be caused by a 
malware infection on the citizen’s PC. 
• The EU should promote Opinion 2/2006 document regarding email screening and 
continue to clarify where filtering of content is allowed building on this opinion from the 
Article 29 Working Party. 
• The EU (namely the Article 29 WP) and providers should enter a dialogue to find a 
reasonable balance between the cost and the effectiveness of specific filtering for opt-out. 
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5 Setting standards 
Often it is too difficult – or costly - to determine which measures are appropriate. Instead, 
providers are looking at what others are doing, hoping that the average solution will be both 
cost efficient and appropriate, from an information security perspective. If something goes 
wrong, courts and the public will at least attest a best-effort attempt. 
5.1 Technical and Organizational Security Measures 
Providers have to secure their services, but for the most part, it is up to them to decide the 
details. Technical security measures can apply to the end-users device or the network 
infrastructure hosted at the providers premises. Organizational measures can have an effect 
on all parties involved and range from unidirectional information to multi-lateral cooperation.  
Technical and organizational security measures
• Most providers use 
combination of techniques
• Focus is on protecting 
own network
• DNSSEC is deployed in 
Sweden
• Providers quarantine 
infected computers
• Users act more 
carelessly at work
 
Facts & Observations 
 
- Most providers use a combination of 3-5 different protection techniques. (ENISA 
Survey 2006) 
- Egress filtering (protecting other networks) is much less used than ingress filtering 
(protecting the own network). Most providers offer contact details for email abuse, 
around 15% of them do not. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
- DNSSEC is deployed in Sweden,  the Russian TLD .RU is signed, and tests have been 
made by Mexico and the Netherlands. (see www.dnssec.net/news + www.ripe.net/disi/ ). 
- Two thirds of the providers quarantine infected computers. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
- Around half of the providers have a Business Contingency process or a Disaster Recovery 
process (often mandated by corporate governance requirements). However, providers 
admit that these processes are rarely tested. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
- Only half of the providers make an effort to inform subscribers regularly and in detail, 
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e.g. with written guidance or with regular information via web site, email or physical 
mail. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
- In the United States, 48 percent of workers who admit they are more likely to open 
suspicious emails or Web links on their work computers than at home said it was 
because they had IT to support them if something bad happened. Germany (39%) and 
Japan (28%) featured similar results. (Trend Micro study, 2005)  
- Many fraudsters are not concerned about revealing their identity, because they often 
live in countries where they do not expect punishment. 
 
Evaluations & Conclusions  
 
- Countermeasures depend on the type of business, the size and the maturity of the 
provider. It also depends on the type of client on which the provider focuses its activities. 
Enterprise clients (who often desire some autonomy in their operations) have other 
requirements than consumers (who often look for the cheapest service). The 
differentiation between enterprise and consumer clients can be problematic for small 
enterprises, who often act like consumers (lack of security expertise) but at the same time 
require business level performance (24x7 connectivity). 
- Since many providers depend on customer complaints to become aware of security 
problems, it is coherent that most of the providers offer contacts details. 
- Providers still do not take training and awareness-raising serious enough and rarely offer 
courses. One might argue that it is not the role of an infrastructure provider to do so, even 
though they are in a good position for such activity, given that they have existing 
relationships with large numbers of Internet users. They would also benefit from an 
educated user, mitigating the risk of malicious activity from that user. 
- Alternatively, the government could be in charge. Examples in some countries have 
proven that eCommerce benefits when users learn how to use new technology (e.g. 
introduction of the eID card in Belgium). 
- The implementation of DNSSEC in a country is a complex process, and overall DNSSEC 
penetration is low. 
 
Advice & Proposals 
 
• ENISA – in cooperation with the community of providers - should establish a platform for 
information exchange about measures to secure electronic communications.  
• The EU and ENISA should promote specific measures, such as quarantining of computers 
(in compliance with privacy legislation), availability of contact details for security issues 
and email abuse, filtering and DNSSEC. 
• Consumers need better information and training on specific security issues. This could 
best be provided and would have the broadest reach with public-private partnerships 
between government entities and providers. 
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5.2 Measures to fight spam 
Originally, spam was considered a mere nuisance and not a security issue. However, a 
changing landscape of threats (sometimes called “threatscape”) makes one question this 
assumption as phishing attacks, spyware, and botnets (also called crimeware) spread via 
email and are often indistingushable from ordinary spam. Spamming in telephony (SPIT) and 
instant messaging (SPIM) add also complexity to the threatscape.  
 
Measures to fight spam
• Many counter measures are 
of legal nature
• Anti-spam laws are in 
place in the EU
• Providers are worried about 
law suits from spammers
• Providers reject direct SMTP
• Statistical info varies
• OECD anti-spam toolkit published
• Several code of conduct for providers exist
 
 
Facts & Observations 
 
- Most measures that providers take to prevent subscribers from sending spam are of legal 
nature such as “forbid spamming in Terms & Conditions” and “inform subscribers about 
the legal consequences of spamming”. The technique most often used to limit spam in 
received email is blacklisting. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
- Almost all EU countries have anti-spam laws. However, on a worldwide basis, only 23% 
of the countries have anti-spam legislation enacted, 64% of the countries do not have such 
laws. (ITU Survey on Anti-Spam legislation worldwide)  
- Sometimes providers are afraid of law suits from spammers when blocking them. In 
some developing countries, (anti-spam) law enforcement is seen as difficult, because such 
countries do not have sufficient investigative powers. (MAAWG conference) 
- In nine countries in Europe, fines were imposed on spammers ranging from around 
thousand Euros up to tens of thousands of Euros (with two exceptions of very low fines). 
(CNSA) 
- Some providers admit that some of their customers are spammers. (ENISA 
Survey 2006) 
- Spam statistics from filtering vendors vary widely and change quickly. Often there are 
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only few EU Member States on the list of sending countries (e.g. www.Spamhaus.org , 
21.6.2006, only the UK at rank #8, accounting for 3% of spam) and more on the list of 
spam receiving countries (e.g. four EU countries suffering from 21% of the world’s spam, 
according to TrendMicro, June 2006). In all cases, the US is on top of the list. 
- 25% of providers reject direct SMTP connections. The number is increasing as more 
and more providers decide to “manage” port 25. Very many providers offer spam filtering 
free-of-charge on their network, others offer it for a fee; still, around 20% do not offer 
any filtering (neither without nor with fee). Canadian providers have also successfully 
used this method to limit spam. 
- In 2006, the OECD published the OECD Anti-Spam toolkit. It recommends measures in 
the areas of regulation, enforcement, industry driven initiative, technologies, education 
and awareness, co-operative partnership, spam measurement, global co-operation. (OECD 
Anti-Spam toolkit) 
- The joint BIAC-MAAWG (as part of the OECD toolkit), Australia, Finland, and Italy (as 
well as others) have developed codes of conduct for providers to fight spam. 
- While there have been initiatives on White Listing for direct email marketing (e.g. the 
Certified Sender Alliances, initiated by eco in Germany), most email marketers deal with 
it on a case-by-case basis. 
- Sender authentication techniques like SIDF and DKIM associate an IP address or a 
message with a domain name. Although these mechanisms are flawed (spammers use 
these techniques as well to authenticate their emails), they are part of the solution, and can 
be complemented with reputation schemes. Sender authentication has already achieved 
some deployment, in particular when considering that large amounts of email senders can 
be covered by publishing authentication records for high profile domains such as eBay, 
Yahoo, Hotmail, Gmail, PayPal. When such companies request their users to disregards 
all emails from their domain that are not signed, this will increase pressure on other 
companies to also implement sender authentication. (MAAWG conference) 
- The EU initiated the Contact Network of Spam Authorities (CNSA), bringing together 
DPAs and NRAs, depending on the country. The CNSA shares information on emerging 
problems, reporting of spam and prosecution of spam cases. 21 countries have signed up 
so far. The CNSA is similar to the London Action Plan (LAP), worldwide initiative led 
by the UK/US. CNSA and LAP operate closely. 
- There are several initiatives for collecting data on spam. “Spotspam” is an initiative by 
the German e-Commerce association “eco” in combination with the Polish NASK, funded 
by the EU. “Signal Spam” is a similar project in France, supported by several French 
ministries. A Memorandum of Understanding between the two initiatives has been signed 
recently. Digital Phishnet is an initiative in the United States. 
- In some countries, reporting of spam is burdensome, e.g. different authorities are 
responsible for different types of spam or complaints are only possible via ordinary mail. 
On the other hand, in the Netherlands reporting of spam has been made easy with an 
online form and consequently the authorities received a large number of reports. (CNSA) 
- Consumer’s reporting of spam is a problem. Even if reporting is made easy, deleting 
spam is always easier. A decrease in reported spam does not mean less spam. (CNSA) 
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Evaluations & Conclusions  
 
- Europe suffers more than above average from spam and is less often the origin of spam. 
However, it might not stay this way. Spammers increasingly use bot-nets for sending 
spam from European countries. These are installed on consumer PCs with always-on 
broadband connections.  
- The situation of spam is similar to the situation of firewalls in the early days. Then, the 
first approach of firewalls was to block all malicious traffic, similar to black listing of 
spammers. This works, as long as the type and volume of malicious traffic is understood 
and controllable. Later, the strategy for firewalls changed from default-allow to default-
deny, which is similar to white list filtering and authentication of emails. 
- Detailed technical and organizational guidance on fighting spam is available 
- From a legal perspective, spam originating in Europe is not the problem; it is the lack of 
anti-spam laws and their enforcement outside of Europe. Within Europe, the legal conflict 
between confidentiality of communications (privacy) and filtering of communication 
(security) is more relevant. 
- It must be considered, that spam is not simply a problem of ISPs. Rather it is a whole 
ecosystem consisting of big and small connectivity providers, hosters for applications and 
platforms, DNS, email and other service providers. Technical and legal changes affect the 
system as a whole. 
 
Advice & Proposals 
 
• Providers should focus on driving interoperability and standardization, in particular of 
sender authentication mechanisms. 
• Providers should manage SMTP connections via port 25. 
• Member States should help educating end users on spam problems and solutions. This 
could be done at Member States, level linked to the i2010 initiative and eAdministration. 
• Awareness campaigns by Member States should also stress that reporting of spam does 
have an impact in the fight against spam. 
• ENISA should promote the use of “Spotspam” and related projects. 
• Given the amount of best practice guides available, ENISA will only summarize best 
practice and otherwise refer to existing guides. 
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6 Appendix 
6.1 Terms & Definitions 
 
Blacklist A blacklist is an access control mechanism that means, allow everybody, except members of 
the blacklist. –Source: Wikipedia 
Content Filtering Content filtering is the most commonly used group of methods to filter for security problems 
(e.g. viruses). Content filters act either on the content, the information contained in the mail 
body, or on the mail headers (like "Subject:") to either classify, accept or reject a mail. – 
Source: Wikipedia/ENISA 
DKIM Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM) provides a method for validating an identity that is 
associated with a message, during the time it is transferred over the Internet. That identity 
then can be held accountable for the message. Source: http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ 
DNSSEC DNSSEC (short for DNS Security Extensions) adds security to the Domain Name System 
(DNS) used on Internet Protocol networks. It is a set of extensions to DNS, which provide 
origin authentication of DNS data, data integrity, and authenticated denial of existence (i.e. 
authenticated non-existence reply). DNSSEC was designed to protect the Internet from 
certain attacks such as DNS cache poisoning. All answers in DNSSEC are digitally signed. 
By checking the signature, a DNS resolver is able to check if the information is identical 
(correct and complete) to the info on the authoritative DNS server. – Source: Wikipedia, 
based on RFC 4033-4035 
Electronic 
communication 
network 
Electronic communications network means transmission systems and, where applicable, 
switching or routing equipment and other resources which permit the conveyance of signals 
by wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, 
fixed (circuit- and packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, 
electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting 
signals, networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, 
irrespective of the type of information conveyed. – Source: EU Directive 2002/21/EC 
Electronic 
Communication 
service 
Electronic communications service means a service normally provided for remuneration 
which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications 
networks, including telecommunications services and transmission services in networks 
used for broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or exercising 
editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks and 
services; it does not include information society services, as defined in Article 1 of Directive 
98/34/EC, which do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic 
communications networks. – Source: EU Directive 2002/21/EC 
Measures Information security measures to limit the impact of spam and other malware and to secure 
electronic communication services. – Source: ENISA’s own definition 
Opt-in Allowing unsolicited communication for purposes of direct marketing only with the consent 
of the subscriber. – Source: ENISA’s own definition 
Opt-out Allowing unsolicited communication for purposes of direct marketing unless the subscriber 
expressed the wish to not receive these communications. – Source: ENISA’s own definition 
Providers  
 
Providers of electronic communications networks and services such as ISPs (Internet 
Service Provider), telecommunication companies, hosting and similar service providers. – 
Source: ENISA’s own definition 
Quarantining a 
computer 
Quarantining a computer means isolating a computer into a special network until it has 
reached a certain security level. The computer is offered to install updates for anti-virus 
signature files or install software patches. – Source: ENISA’s own definition 
Sender ID Sender ID validates the origin of e-mail by verifying the IP address of the sender against the 
purported owner of the sending domain. – Source: Microsoft 
SIDF The Sender ID Framework (SIDF) is an e-mail authentication technology protocol 
combining the Sender Policy Framework (SPF) and the Microsoft Sender ID for e-mail into 
a single standard. – Source: Microsoft 
Sender Policy Sender Policy Framework (SPF) is an extension to Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), 
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Framework 
(SPF) 
the standard Internet protocol for transmitting e-mail.. – Source: Wikipedia 
Whitelist A whitelist, is an access control mechanism which means, allow nobody, except members of 
the white list. – Source: Wikipedia 
Zombies It is a computer attached to the Internet that has been compromised by a security hacker, a 
computer virus, or a trojan horse. Generally, a compromised machine is only one of many in 
a "botnet", and will be used to perform malicious tasks of one sort or another under remote 
direction. Most owners of zombie computers are unaware that their system is being used in 
this way. Because the vector tends to be unconscious, these computers are metaphorically 
compared to a zombie. – Source: Wikipedia 
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http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/threatreport/index.jsp  
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2005, http://www.trendmicro.com/en/about/news/pr/archive/2005/pr091305.htm
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Goodmail Systems –  
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6.3 Additional links 
 
Best Practices 
• Good Practice for combating Unsolicited Bulk Email - 
http://www.ripe.net/docs/spam.html 
• MAAWG and APWG Anti-Phishing Best Practice –  
http://www.maawg.org/about/publishedDocuments/Anti_Phishing_Best_Practice.pdf  
• BIAC and MAAWG Best Practices for ISP – http://www.oecd-
antispam.org/article.php3?id_article=232  
 
Statistics 
• MAAWG stats -  
• Spamhaus - http://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/countries.lasso  
• Trend Micro - http://www.trendmicro.com/spam-map/default.asp  
• Sophos - http://www.sophos.com/pressoffice/news/articles/2006/07/dirtydozjul06.html 
 
Others 
• ITU Cybersecurity Gateway - http://www.itu.int/cybersecurity/ 
• Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) - http://www.antiphishing.org/  
• Digital PhishNet - http://www.digitalphishnet.org 
 
 
 
